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Contract and Dispossession
Deborah Waire Post*

In the past, law students often opened their Contracts casebooks to find a quotation from
Sir Henry Maine, ―The movement of progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from
Status to Contract.‖1 The placement of this quote at the beginning of a Contracts book set the
tone for the semester or the year, providing a theme that the law professor either embraced or
critiqued: the idea that contract is liberatory.2 This essay, part of a collection of essays on the
same theme, argues that contract law has become an instrument of oppression, of dispossession,
rather than of liberation. Having offered a critique, the challenge then is consider whether it is
possible to restore the liberatory potential of contract. This Essay is an attempt to use Marxist
theory, if one credits Robert Sullivan‘s argument that Marx was anthropological in his
epistemology and in his form of argument, to examine the way law recognizes and regulates
status relationships. 3 Sullivan also argues that the theoretical approach advocated by some
anthropologists, a ―cultural critique of ourselves,‖ 4 is Marxist because it is the ―modern analogue
to Marx‘s earlier use of ethnography as a critique of nineteenth century capitalist economy and
as an alternative way of ‗seeing‘ reality, of demystifying and denaturalizing cultural texts and
‗reading‘ their social meaning.
In this Essay there are two reference points consistent with a cultural critique. One is the
importance of social position in a jurisprudence that embraces objectivity; the uncritical and
unreflective reliance on hegemonic social practices, codes and conventions in determining
whether the parties to an agreement meant or intended it to be legally enforceable. The resort
by judges to hegemonic conceptions of status results in dispossession when a contract which is
exploitive is enforced against the less powerful party or when courts refuse to enforce contracts
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SIR HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 5 (1864). See e.g. JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, CONTRACTS: CASE AND MATERIALS,
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EXPERIMENTAL MOMENT IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1986).

that have liberatory potential. The other aspect of a cultural critique is a focus on the discursive
practices used by judges in contract cases. For example, these rhetorical devices invoke ideals of
freedom, autonomy and voluntariness to explain or justify the enforcement of contract terms that
disadvantage or defeat the expectations of workers. In other cases freedom and autonomy are
jettisoned in favor of the rhetoric of scarcity, efficiency or the imperative of profitable operation
to defeat the contract claims of employees, particularly when the bargaining power of the
workers has been enhanced by collective bargaining.

Contract as Dispossession: Status and Intent as “Socially Legitimate” Expectations
Students of business organization are drawn to partnership law because of the intimacy
of the relationship and the drama inherent in struggles between and among partners.5 There is no
other area of law better suited to illustrate the importance of status, which is, for purposes of this
analysis, the position each of us occupies in the hierarchical social order that exists in the United
States. Once a matter of common law, partnership is now governed by the Uniform Partnership
Act. Status is explicit in the definition of partnership as ―an association of two or more persons
for the purpose of carrying on as co-owners of a business for profit,‖ in the laundry list of
relationships which are not partnership.6 The courts in the 19th and early 20th century, adopted
and abandoned various tests for partnership, but the test which currently has pride of place, an
inquiry into the intent of the parties, is consistent with the characterization of partnership as a
contract and the statutory definition of the relationship as ‖co-ownershipThe status ―owner‖ is a
socially constructed identity that features shared risk and control, but courts are uncritical in their
examination of the various ways in which risk and control can be shared, unreflective about their
assumptions and the meaning they assign to the words and behavior of the parties. Judicial
analysis of intent does not take place in a vacuum. Part of that analysis, often implicit rather than
explicit, is the judges‘ understanding of when it is socially and culturally possible or plausible for
the parties to consider themselves co-owners.
Partnership can be the most egalitarian of business relationships. The default terms in
partnership law give partners equal rights to control the business and equal shares of the profits.
Labor has value in attaining the status of co-owner in a partnership. 7 One early common law test
for partnership explicitly acknowledged that partnerships could be formed between or among
parties who contributed property, money or labor.8 No legal scholars has measured or
quantified the number of times courts have concluded that someone who contributed labor to an
enterprise was a partner. A review of the cases does, however, show that t status is implicated:
prior or existing relationships matter in determining whose labor would be sufficient to support a
claim of co-ownership: family members, former employees, women, or persons of color.
5
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In the older cases, the social order is explicit. Behavior and words were interpreted in
light of cultural expectations. The relationship between wives and husbands may have be
negotiated in their everyday lives, but that does not mean that the law acknowledged or enforced
those agreements. In Watson v. Hamilton,9 a 1912 Alabama case, the autonomy and the
expectations of a wife who had negotiated with her husband for an ownership interest in what
she supposed was a family business were defeated by a court that refused to give effect to that
agreement.10 Mr. Hamilton might have added his wife‘s name to the name of the business and
acquiesced (or at least he did not contradict her) when, as she worked with him, he heard her tell
his customers that she was an owner of the business. The court rejected this evidence of his
intentions to share the business with her because it knew that he meant only to appease her.11 He
did not intend to make her a co-owner because that would have exposed her to the risk of loss,
something no husband would do.12 As far as the court was concerned, the wife had no interest in
the business and her niece, the heir to whom she left her property, the plaintiff in this case, had
no claim against the partnership for the value of her aunt‘s interest.
Despite a shared assumption in contract theory that context matters and in anthropology
that cultural assumptions vary over time and regionally in the United States, seventy years later,
a federal judge in New York explained his decision in Sherrier v. Richards13 in a way that
suggests there is some consistency in the meaning assigned to a species of verbal exchange
between men and women in intimate relations. In 1983, Judge Robert W. Sweet described the
verbal exchange between a man and woman, a wealthy widow who financed art acquisitions and
her married actor/art dealer lover, as an ―anything you say, dear‖ moment.14 The reasonableness
of this interpretation was corroborated, as far as the judge was concerned, by testimony of the
woman that in another context, the same or similar language was ―a conversational device to
diffuse an argument.‖15 The apparent assent of Mr. Sherrier to a proposal that would have
transformed a loan from Ms. Richards into equity in a business was dismissed as
inconsequential, and therefore insufficient to establish the intent to form a partnership. And, of
course, without intent there can be no contract for partnership.
Whether the parties are married or simply lovers, the coexistence of economic and
emotional ties alters the way courts understand even the most straightforward expressions of
contractual intent. In both Watson and Sherrier, the courts constructed a presumptive negative
intent with respect to a claim of partnership from cultural norms that originated in the status of
the parties as intimates.
If contract were liberatory, courts would have to acknowledge that private ordering may
be subversive of the existing social order; contract law would be a means of dismantling
structures of subordination. Contract law is theorized as a system of private ordering, but judges
are not particularly receptive to private arrangements that are subversive. A courtroom is not the
place where cultural or social transgressions are routinely validated, even when the law as
9
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expressed seems sufficiently malleable and capable of accommodating the behavior of outliers
on the cultural landscape. The predictable response in contract disputes that have transformative
potential is to bring them into alignment with hegemonic assumptions about social status.16
A post-reconstruction era partnership case out of Texas, a post reconstruction case, is
instructive on the relationship between cultural expectations, social norms, and contract. The
political and socioeconomic reality in the South included a system of laws and social
conventions that expressed and enforced a racial caste system. Yet transgressive social
relationships formed during the era of Jim Crow, including relationships that involved political
or economic cooperation or exchange, were not unknown.17
There was a story in Texas—either fact or fable—about a black man who cornered the
market on potatoes. If he wanted to exploit the monopoly he had on the existing supply of
potatoes in a way that maximized his profits, he needed to market these potatoes to whites as
well as blacks. He was cognizant of the fact that his business acuity might not be well received
in the white community. His ability to extract higher prices was certainly constrained by Jim
Crow. So this black man struck a deal with a white man who owned a dry goods establishment.
He agreed to share the profits from his sales if the white man would provide him with ―cover.‖
The black man painted his wagons the same color as the wagons that delivered for the dry goods
store and embellished them with the name of that business. He then drove all over Houston
delivering potatoes to white families willing to pay market price for potatoes.
The verisimilitude of this story, the possibility that such an agreement could have existed,
is supported by case law. Gene Butler v. State18 features a black man in Austin, Texas who, in
1908 was apparently was given responsibility for developing business hauling gravel and
dirt.The question of partnership was raised as a defense in an appeal after Butler was accused
and convicted of embezzling money from a white man named Dillingham.19 If Butler and
Dillingham were partners; if Dillingham put his wagons and horses into a business to which
Butler contributed his labor and perhaps any good will associated with his reputation as a driver,
there would not have been a crime. As a co-owner of the business, Butler could not be guilty of
embezzlement.
In earlier cases, precedent cited by defense counsel and the presiding judge in his dissent,
white men who had arrangements like that of Butler and Dillingham were partners. 20 The
16

For an opposing standpoint see Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 829
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behavior of the parties was all that mattered in determining partnership. In Butler v. State,
however, the majority justified its decision by citing the testimony of the two parties as to their
intent.21 The court admitted that its decision did not comport with prior precedent, but concluded
The testimony of appellant was to the effect that he did not regard the arrangement between
himself and Dillingham as a partnership. Dillingham also testified to the same effect. Under
this testimony and in the light of the charge of the court, we think that appellant is absolutely
without any ground or cause of complaint.22
The defense attorney must have been aware that his reliance on precedent and principle
would require the court to validate a relationship that was taboo. In that sense, at least, the
analogy he drew between Butler and an earlier defendant in a civil suit and the defendants in
earlier criminal cases was inapposite.23 The application of existing precedent would have
exonerated Mr. Butler, which the majority opinion in the case conceded. An ―objective‖ test,
one that looked at the meaning that the parties could reasonably assign to their behavior, the
intent that their acts expressed, produced the opposite result.
Unlike the earlier cases, the court and the parties to this dispute were constrained by
racial ideology and social practices, which made any expression of equality between these two
parties impossible. The defense attorney‘s brief, from which the dissenting judge quoted
extensively, is a case study of the way subjectivity is constructed. In this brief, which refers to
the defendant as an ―ignorant negro‖ the interplay of external and internal ―forces‖: the
representations and symbols that are extant in any community and individual consciousness and
agency are on display.24 As the dissent acknowledged, neither the black man nor the white man
in Butler would have contemplated or admitted in court or in public that they were partners. 25
The past is always instructive in understanding the present. Status defined by nationality
or class has played an important role in the way contract law treats the working class. The
contracts casebook I wrote with Nancy Ota and Amy Kastely begins with the 19th century
contract labor case in Hawaii, H.J. Coolidge v. Pua’aiki and Kea. A while ago, I was trying to
convince a colleague to adopt the casebook for his class. ―You can‘t really expect me to use a
book that begins with a contract labor case?‖ he responded with some incredulity. I suppose he
embezzlement of proceeds from sale of organ); Kelly Island & Lime Transp. v. Masterson, 93 S.W. 427 (Tex. 1906)
(defendant was partners with company building roads in Beaumont because he put in money and they put in labor).
21
According to Dillingham ―‗the defendant, Gean Butler, that negro boy there, was hauling gravel and dirt with a
team of mine in said county . . . The arrangement between Butler and myself with reference to this hauling was this:
I agreed to furnish the team, wagon and harness, feed the team, keep the mules shod, feed defendant and give him a
place to sleep, and he was to take the team and do such hauling as he could get, and we were to divide the money
made by him in hauling, half and half.‖ This arrangement was one the defense argued constituted a partnership.
The court notes that Dillingham ―further testified he had no intention of creating a partnership between himself and
appellant.‘ ‖ Butler, 111 S.W. at 148.
22
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24
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25
According to the defense attorney, Butler testified on cross examination that ― he guessed‖ he was not a partner of
Dillingham‘s and ―he guessed‖ the money he received from Dillingham was wages. Id. As for Dillingham, the
defense attorney argued that it would not have occurred to him that ― … his contract with the negro constituted them
partners. Dillingham would doubtless have scorned such a relationship.‖ Id.. The lawyer concluded, and the
dissenting judge agreed that the testimony of these two witnesses was ―. . . of little, if any, value‖ in deciding the
partnership question. Id.

thought his objections to a contract labor case were self-evident. For my part, I was sure he did
not see the irony of such an assertion at a moment when U.S. v. Sabhnanis26 was being tried in
the federal court across the street. The Sabhnanis starved, beat and tortured their domestic help,
in violation of the Anti-Peonage statute, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Trafficking Victims
and Violence Prevention Act.
One could argue that the law no longer plays a role in the peonage of people of color. In
fact, as the Sabhnanis case shows, the law punishes such behavior. This answer, however, is
reassuring but self-deluding. Businesses are built upon the immigration policies of the United
States, which facilitate the recruitment of some foreign workers and guarantee cheap labor by
excluding others. Global Horizons Manpower Inc., for instance, is a ―labor recruiting firm‖
charged with trafficking 400 Thai farm workers forced to work on farms in Hawaii.27 H.J.
Coolidge,28 decided in 1877, involved a statutory scheme that made it possible for large sugar
plantations to find the labor they needed–both indigenous Hawai‘ians and workers recruited in
China, Japan, and eventually in Portugal, the Philipines and Korea. The legal context of the
Global Horizons Management case is the ability of the labor contractors to obtain or procure H2A visas for the workers who are transported to the United States.29
Discursive Practices and Dispossession: The Rhetoric of Austerity or Scarcity
H.J. Coolidge is instructive not only for its historical interest, but also for the deployment
of language and concepts that still have currency in contract law. It relies on the precepts of
contractual freedom: voluntariness and assent to justify the enforcement of the contracts at issue.
Voluntariness and assent do much of the heavy lifting when it comes to subordination and
exploitation.
We no longer have slavery or even Jim Crow, but social position still matters in contract.
It is expressed in the perversity of the at will employment doctrine,30 and in the judicial
26
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Murphy v. Am. Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293 (N.Y. 1983) New York Court of Appeals refuses to ―alter
the long standing rule that where an employment contracts is for an indefinite term it is presumed to be a hiring at
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rule appear to have been motivated by conclusions that the freedom of contract underpinnings of the rule have
become outdated, that individual employees in the modern work force do not have the bargaining power to negotiate
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acquiescence to the corporate message that downsizing and outsourcing are both necessary and
inevitable.31 For almost thirty years, each recession in a cyclical economy has been used to alter
the relationship between employers and employees. The economy may recover from a recession,
but workers never do. Each recession brings layoffs or buyouts, downsizing, outsourcing, and
the displacement of workers into the contingent workforce. 32 The persistence over the past two
decades of troubling employer practices—affecting both the number of people who work for
corporations and the working conditions of blue and white collar workers, assembly line and
salaried middle managemen—marks the downward trajectory of the American middle class. 33
James Galbraith has suggested in his book, Created Unequal: The Crisis in American
Pay, that ―public policies before 1970 largely supported a middle class society‖ and that this
support meant a ―broadly equal pattern of social progress was sustained.‖ 34 The connection
between conditions of employment, the creation of an expansive middle class and national pride
seems to be lost on everyone except a recent recipient of a bailout. The law affirms, at every
turn, the practices which strip workers of the ability to counter the power of employers:
multinational corporations and governments.
For many years now, contract law courses have included cases that feature employment
contracts including wrongful termination and plant closing cases. For an individual worker, the
presumption of at-will employment is a juridical thumb on the scales of justice that dooms most
wrongful termination cases. After a brief interlude in which courts used employee handbooks
and public policy to constrain the at will doctrine, a retreat was sounded in the face of employer

security for the jobs on which they have grown to rely, and the rule yields harsh results for those employees who do
not enjoy the benefits of express contractual limitations on the power of dismissal.‖ Id. at 301. The court in
American Home Products shifted responsibility for reform to the legislature.
31
A classic example of this language can be found in the decision written by Judge Lambros in United Steelworkers
of America v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (―This nation is in the throes of
growing pains of similar intensity to the traumatic changes brought by the advent of the steam engine and the
Industrial Revolution …‖). Only this new era presaged a ―painful process of relocation and restructuring,‖ mostly
for blue-collar workers. Id.
32
Definitions of contingent workers vary and the most commonplace definitions include those who work in
conditions of job insecurity and who have few or no job benefits. The Bureau of Labor Statistics generally
considers contingent workers those who do not expect to be employed for a year or more while it classifies as
―alternative employment‖ those who are hired as independent contractors, as temporary workers, on call workers or
contract company workers. See Chris Benner, Contingent & Temporary Workers in Work, in WORK IN AMERICA:
AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLICY AND SOCIETY 108 (Carl E. Van Horn and Herbert A Schaffner eds., 2003).
It is possible to chart the restructuring of labor relationships in the reports on the various economic recessions over
the past twenty years. See e.g., Cindy Skrzycki, The Drive to Downsize; Trimming is a Corporate Fact of Life—But
there are Hazards, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1989, at H1 (recognition that downsizing was done to ―increase
productivity‖ as often as it was done in response to economic downturn.); Ralph A. Pyatt, Jr. The Big Question of
Downsizing: Whose Left to Earn and Spend?, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1993, at B15 (reporting that nearly half of major
U.S. companies cut their work forces from July 1992 to June 1993); Louis Uchitelle, Downsizing Comes Back, but
the Outcry is Muted, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7 1998, at A1 (outcries and conflict that characterized the waves of
downsizing in the 1980‘s and early 1990‘s‖ were gone by the end of the millennium).
33
Edward Luce, The Crisis of Middle Class America, FIN. TIMES MAG., July 30, 2010,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/1a8a5cb2-9ab2-11df-87e6-00144feab49a.html#axzz1J89hCKaH; Catherine Ramell, Will
Today’s Unemployed Become Tomorrow’s Unemployable, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 02, 2010,
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resistance.35 Employers altered the language and content of the employee handbooks to deny
contractual intent and retrenchment was assured once traditional contract jurisprudence,
including formalism and the consideration doctrine, were deployed.36
Plant closing cases were a different matter, however. At least where collective
bargaining agreements governed the relationship between workers and employers, the disparity
in power between the two parties was reduced and blue collar workers in the United States
enjoyed a standard of living that made the United States a world leader in a meaningful way.
Beginning in the 1970s and 80s, a mere 40 years after federal legislation was passed to end labor
strife, to‖ erect a system of industrial self- government.‖ The labor peace constructed in the
1940s was dismantled with the complicity of courts that refused to enforce promises to keep
plants open.37 The justification of plant closings was the competitive disadvantage suffered by
American manufacturers in the global market because of high labor costs in the United States.
The focus was on the bottom line—on the lack of profits. In retrospect, it would be fair to say
that plant closings not only reduced the costs to a corporate enterprise, a savings to multinational corporations that weakened immeasurably the economic health of the nation, but also
dealt an almost fatal blow to unions.38
The success that the private sector had in crippling unions is now being played out in the
public sector and the strategy is much the same.39 No one can dispute the fact that the federal,
state and local governments are operating at a deficit, but the austerity is a false austerity, a
conscious decision to reduce revenues. Still, the rhetoric of scarcity and austerity is just as
effective in the cases where state legislatures have eviscerated legislatively public unions,
perhaps one of the last bastions of the middle class that had job security, health benefits and a
living wage. 40
35

Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of the Implied Employment Contract, 29 BERKELEY J EMP. & LAB. L.
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37
Consider the decision in Abbington v. Dayton Malleable, Inc. 561 F. Supp. 1290 (S.D. Ohio 1983) where a judge
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Abbington, 561 F. Supp. 1290.
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The New York Times reported that ―State officials from both parties are wrestling with ways to curb the salaries
and pensions of government employees, which typically make up a significant percentage of state budgets.‖ Steven
Greenhouse, Strained States Turning to Law to Curb Labor Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/04/business/04labor.html. It soon became obvious, at least to union members,
that the legislation was not about budgets, but the existence of unions. Legislation limiting the bargaining power of
unions, depriving them of union dues and forcing them to the certifying elections on an annual basis was framed
initially as reforms driven by fiscal and budgetary needs. See also Steven Greenhouse, Ohio Lawmakers Pass AntiUnion Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/04/business/04labor.html (reporting
Governor Scott Walker‘s statement in a speech that ―We can no longer live in a society where the public employees
are the haves and the taxpayers who foot the bills are the have-nots‖).
40
See, e.g., Jeffrey Poole et al. v. City of Waterbury et al, 831 A.2d 211 (Conn. 2003) (oversight board created by
state legislation has the power to arbitrate labor contract and limit the benefits of retired firefighters); Boston Hous.

In an economy that has become addicted to speculation and paper profits, ironically
enough the importance of labor is acknowledged only in advertisements aimed at the working
class, designed to persuade the public to go out and buy the quintessential product of American
culture: the Chrysler 2010 Jeep Cherokee. This advertisement expresses sentiments that evoke an
emotional response; it deploys symbols associated with deeply held American values: our
identity as ―builders‖ who create skyscrapers and complete transcontinental railroads. The
commercial evokes the sense of personal satisfaction and national pride that can be found in the
production of beautiful, well designed and well made goods. It evokes nostalgia for the good old
days of assembly line production of cars.
The things that make us Americans are the things we make. This has always been
a nation of builders, craftsmen, men and women for whom straight stitches and clean
welds are a matter of personal pride.
They made the skyscrapers, the cotton gins, colt revolvers and jeep 4x4s. These
things make us who we are.
As a people, we do well when we make good things, and not so well when we
don‘t. The good news is this can be put right. We just have to do it. So we did it.
This, our newest son, was imagined, drawn, carved, stamped here and forged here
in America. It is well made, and it is designed to work.
This was once a country where people made things, beautiful things. And so it is
again. 41
One can laugh at this commercial and the identity it creates between assembly line work
and national pride. It is not as easy to dismiss the idea that work, pride and dignity are
connected, particularly as we struggle through what is now sometimes called the Great
Recession.42
What we lost in the transformation from an industrial to an information economy, was
not just knowledge, or the wages that lifted up a significant part of the American workforce to
the middle class, but self regard and dignity. Capitalism is now, in the words of one scholar, ―the
space of the anti-market where financiers, speculators, and the political power of states come
together to make profits without the constraints of competition.‖ 43 The recovery from the Great
Recession has been described as ―bifurcated‖ because those who have higher education, the
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college graduates, are the only people who are being hired. The jobs many of these college
graduates are taking are those that were filled in the past by those who did not have the benefit of
a higher education. Education may not In this new economy, education is corporatized. In what
has been labeled an ―information‖ economy, intellectuals are just an ―academic‖ workforce. 44
Something close to 70% of the professionals teaching in colleges and universities were
contingent workers.45 If the accreditation standards for law schools are revised as proposed, law
professors may soon join the ranks of other contingent workers.
We live in a time with no name, a period that we locate historically and chronologically
with reference to the past. We are post-modern, post-Marxist, post-racial, post-paradigmatic.
We are uncertain about our present and anxious and insecure about our future. I admit to a
dystopic vision of what is to come. Already we have judges who affirm the right of our doctors,
and the research facilities in which they work, to patent our cells and DNA and sell them for
profit.46 Already too many people make desperate choices that involve the sale or lease of their
bodies.47
If there is any hope at all, I would locate it in the possibilities inherent in a cultural
critique and in the potential of human beings to act subversively. The virtue of a cultural critique
is that it invites us to ask whether something is truly impossible or simply unimagined because of
what we think we know and what we believe to be true. As long as I can find cases like Butler v.
State48, where an injustice certainly was done, I am also able to see evidence of our willingness
as human beings to transgress, to subvert existing norms. I am referring not just to Butler and
Dillingham, but to the defense attorney who argued that Butler and Dillingham had a partnership
and the presiding judge, who reprinted the defense brief in his dissent. Unlike Justice Harlan,
they held fast to what they knew the law required even though it meant that the state would have
to acknowledge and enforce the agreements of private citizens which subverted the social
inequality that they understood and believed would continue to exist.
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